New report blames Russia’s shadow fleet for European drone incursions

A report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) said it was ‘highly likely’ that many of the recent drone incidents across Europe were ordered by Moscow as part of a wider hybrid campaign against NATO.

The investigation focuses on incidents that occurred between August 2024 and February 2026, including incursions into the airspace of 13 individual countries. Of these countries, all but Ireland are NATO members.

Among the intrusions documented in the report are: It targeted a US air force base in the UK. – any aeronautical scientist deeply covered across three articles – The same goes for the French Navy ballistic missile submarine base incident. long island.

By corroborating various reports of drone intrusions with data known or suspected to belong to the vessel. Russia’s Shadow FleetIISS specifically named several vessels it believed were responsible for launching and/or manipulating drones.

For reference, the cargo ship is harve dolphin IMO 9073854, investigated by Germany and the Netherlands after a drone intrusion in the spring of 2025, was actually docked in Hull, England, while British and American authorities were dealing with a drone sighting of a military base in November 2024.

tanker at the same time Season I (IMO 9308950) moved east through the Strait of Dover and was routed roughly parallel to the south coast of East Anglia, where RAF Lakenheath, RAF Mildenhall and several other sensitive US and British military installations were located.

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Selected locations of Russian Shadow Fleet tankers around Germany and the UK on November 26, 2024 (Image source: International Institute for Strategic Studies)

At the time of the intrusion, anonymous US officials suggested that the drones were far more sophisticated than commercially available civilian drones. As we noted, the intrusion into these critical U.S. bases occurred just days after President Joe Biden issued an order to Ukraine. The long-awaited all-clear It uses long-range missiles to attack targets deep inside Russian territory.

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A selection of reported UAV sightings in Europe by location and location from August 2024 to February 2026 (Image source: International Institute for Strategic Studies)

In a summary of the lengthy report, IISS argues that while it is unlikely that all UAV incidents during this period were linked to Russia, “the overall pattern of UAV sightings cannot be adequately explained by misidentification, hobbyism, or opportunistic harassment alone.”

careful investigation

There is no convincing evidence of Russian involvement, and no country affected by drone intrusions has yet pointed directly in Russia’s direction. But IISS researchers suggested that these countries implicitly approved the report. “Every government we interviewed said they would welcome the release of the report,” said Charlie Edwards, senior fellow for strategy and national security.

Without a smoking gun, some people questioned the report’s findings. Dronewatch Europe said: “The conclusions are surprising, but worth careful examination.”

“The report does not present any physical evidence linking a specific drone to a specific vessel. No launches were observed, no command links were intercepted, no wreckage was recovered, no reliable video footage was recorded, and no telemetry or forensic data linking the drones to the Russian vessel was released.”

Of course, this forensic data is difficult for non-state actors to obtain. To gather hard facts in cases like these, basic radar data and advanced intelligence capabilities (including the use of electro-optical sensors, signals intelligence (SIGINT), and human intelligence (HUMINT)) are paramount.

It is unclear whether the competent intelligence agencies of the countries involved – in many cases among the best in the world – actually collected these facts. While it could be argued that it is true that no country has come forward and presented a comprehensive case for Russian interference, it is also true that doing so would compromise some of the capabilities and/or sources of intelligence available to Russia. Proving Russia’s guilt in the public domain may not outweigh the value of these intelligence assets.

Dronewatch’s own investigation into 61 drone sightings across Europe in 2025 found that “reported drones turned out to be completely ordinary aircraft, helicopters, stars, planets or other explainable phenomena. In many cases, there was no evidence at all that drones existed.”

The IISS report covers these initial investigations, but asserts that “in an operational environment where detection capabilities in Europe are clearly insufficient to reliably track low-altitude, uncooperative UAVs, high rates of non-confirmation, regardless of sightings, are an expected outcome.”

“The high rate of false positives in public reports is analytically consistent with the design of Russian operations: designing an ambiguous environment in which it is difficult to distinguish between real intrusions and noise is itself a hallmark of the campaign,” the report continues.

Regardless of whether the drones are actually linked to Russia, IISS said Europe’s counter-UAS (C-UAS) strategy has not currently kept up with the threat these systems pose. “Detection is patchy, legal authorities are fragmented, response options are often unbalanced, and attribution is too slow to support timely deterrence.”