Guaviare, Colombia – As Colombians prepare for a runoff election on Sunday, June 21 to choose their next president, a leading think tank has warned that the next leader will inherit a security crisis that transcends the border with Ecuador.
The fragmentation of armed groups in Colombia and competition for the illicit economy have exacerbated instability and insecurity on both sides of the border, according to a report from the Royal United Armed Forces Institute (RUSI).
Today, Ecuador and Colombia have much more integrated criminal ecosystems that the two presidential candidates in Sunday’s runoff elections, either Abelardo de la Espriella or Ivan Cepeda, will have to face.
“Colombia’s long-standing struggle with armed violence is something Ecuador previously experienced only on its periphery, but now it faces similar security challenges as its neighbors,” said Jennifer Scotland, co-author of the RUSI analysis. Latin America Report.
“Decentralized organized crime groups have established control over strategic areas, captured state institutions, and diversified into various illicit economies.”
The Role of Cocaine
One of these illicit economies is cocaine.
Situated between Colombia and Peru, two major coca producers, Ecuador has historically played only a limited role in the cocaine economy, while Colombia remains the world’s largest producer, accounting for up to two-thirds of coca production.
But the report says Ecuador is increasingly caught up in human trafficking flows. Ecuador’s porous 600km land border with Colombia and access to the Pacific Ocean have made it a major transit route for cocaine trafficking.
From 2019 to 2024, cocaine seizures in Ecuadorian ports increased by 4,817%, from 6 tons to 295 tons.
Approximately 30% of cocaine seized from shipping containers globally in 2023-24 originated in Ecuadorian ports.
In Europe the rate was much higher. Ecuador is now a major gateway to the European cocaine supply chain.
“Ecuador’s transformation into a central hub on global cocaine trafficking routes is the result of Ecuador’s lack of preparedness to deal with the threat and the reconfiguration of crime dynamics in neighboring Colombia,” Scotland said.
The ripple effect of changing organized crime dynamics in Colombia has transformed Ecuador from “a peripheral country into a central export hub in the global cocaine supply chain,” according to the report.
Roots of the cross-border security crisis
The roots of this go back to the 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC, according to a RUSI briefing.
FARC’s demobilization “reshaped the landscape” as former combatants splintered into dissident groups and new and existing armed actors moved in to fill the vacuum.
Nearly a decade later, the effects are being felt on both sides of the Colombia-Ecuador border.
This fragmentation has reshaped Colombia’s cocaine economy, and competition for supply routes and production areas has given rise to a decentralized model based on a “‘service provider’ system” with different groups managing each step of the supply chain.
By 2023, 65% of Colombia’s coca crop was concentrated in just three departments, including Nariño and Putumayo on the Ecuadorian border and Norte de Santander on the Venezuelan border.
In these border areas, a “hypercompetitive criminal ecosystem” has emerged as rival groups, including FARC dissidents and other armed groups, compete for control of coca-producing areas and trafficking routes to Ecuador and the Pacific coast.
drivers of violence
Ecuador, once considered one of the safest countries in South America, recorded its most violent year on record in 2025, with a murder rate reaching 51 per 100,000 residents.
The analysis links the rise in violence to increased integration with local cocaine trafficking networks in Ecuador and long-standing institutional weaknesses.
Research shows that criminal groups in Ecuador have become more assertive and insurgent, adopting tactics similar to those of armed groups in Colombia and Mexico. These include car bombings and assassinations of journalists, security officials and politicians, including the killing of 2023 presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio, as well as organized attacks such as prison riots and the takeover of a TV station in January 2024.
“The evolution and consolidation of Ecuador’s organized crime groups, and the unprecedented violence that has resulted, have exposed the country’s structural weaknesses,” the report emphasized.
The need for increased cooperation between the two countries
Colombia and Ecuador have formal channels for border security cooperation, including joint operations and intelligence sharing, but the briefing said these efforts are erratic and primarily focused on short-term arrests rather than long-term strategies.
RUSI said these limitations are being further exacerbated by deep ideological differences and strained relations between the two governments, highlighted by the trade war between Colombia’s left-wing leader Petro and Ecuador’s right-wing President Novoa in early 2026.
Moreover, Colombia emphasized negotiations with armed groups under a policy of ‘complete peace’, while Ecuador emphasized a more militarized approach focused on security crackdowns and high-value arrests.
“Despite these shared and interconnected experiences, meaningful bilateral cooperation between the two countries has been blunted by stark ideological differences, forcing both sides to address threats in their own way,” Scotland said.
“To more effectively address this threat, our two countries must work together more intentionally. This requires reviewing the reactive, unilateral responses of the past and considering a more holistic, coordinated strategy that focuses on the drivers, not just the symptoms, of illicit activity across our borders.”
Recommendations include establishing a joint intelligence and operations center to enable real-time data sharing, structured capacity building programs for security forces, and promoting two-way knowledge sharing on counter-narcotics, cyber intelligence and port security. We also call for building trust by engaging youth and marginalized communities.
With Colombia’s elections on Sunday 21 June likely to reshape relations, RUSI warned that continued inaction would result in human costs on both sides of the border.
Featured image caption: Colombia-Ecuador border taken in 2020.
Featured Image Credit: Burkhard Mücke via Wikimedia Commons
