war Ukraine It has become painfully clear that large, fixed military bases are highly vulnerable and, in many cases, a liability. Such bases can serve as regional influence, deterrence, and engines for large-scale combat operations, but they can also be easy targets. This could come in the form of conventional gravity bombs, standoff weapons like advanced cruise missiles, and increasingly affordable mass-produced drones like the Shahed.
that USA The military has relied on a global network of these bases since the Cold War. Since that historic era, U.S. military planners have relied on this broad global framework for the purposes of deterrence, reassurance, and rapid power projection to any hot spots requiring attention. Times have changed, and this reality is especially evident in the Indo-Pacific region. china It possesses a significant number of cruise missiles and a wide range of conventional ballistic missiles.
Local contingencies, especially those involving taiwanThese missiles will likely be used to target U.S. bases across the region. In response, U.S. military strategy shifted to distributed operations, distributing forces and capabilities across smaller, more mobile operational nodes. This is complicating China’s intelligence, surveillance and targeting efforts, with small, remote islands like Wake Island increasingly taking center stage.
Vulnerabilities of U.S. military bases in the Asia-Pacific region
The U.S. military infrastructure in the Asia-Pacific region is vast and deeply entrenched, with approximately 80,000 troops stationed throughout the region, primarily concentrated in Japan and South Korea, a legacy of World War II and the Cold War. There are approximately 90 U.S. military installations throughout mainland Japan and Okinawa, including major military bases. In terms of troops across all services, there are about 60,000 troops stationed in mainland Japan and Okinawa, with the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Navy having the largest concentration of troops at about 20,000 each.
South Korea, on the other hand, has approximately 24,000 to 25,000 permanent soldiers, the majority of whom are U.S. soldiers, and its main forward-deployed unit is the 2nd Infantry.nd Infantry Division. These units include mechanized infantry, artillery, combat aviation, and logistics units. This combat force is spread across 60 to 70 facilities. Although the Army is superior, all U.S. forces have forward units within Korea.
Finally, Guam has a relatively small force of about 9,700 spread out across 46 permanent military bases. Nonetheless, the island holds significant strategic importance as a key link between the U.S. mainland and Asia. The island thus provides powerful and responsive naval, air, and logistics capabilities to U.S. infrastructure in Asia.
|
missile type |
representative system |
estimated missile |
main role |
range |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
SRBM (short-range ballistic missile) |
DF-15, DF-16 |
~600 |
Taiwan crisis, local strike |
|
|
MRBM (medium-range ballistic missile) |
DF-17, DF-21 variants |
~1,300 |
Precision strike, anti-ship, regional deterrence |
1,000~3,000km |
|
IRBM (intermediate range ballistic missile) |
DF-26 |
~500 |
Guam strike, anti-ship strike, regional strike |
3,000~5,500km |
|
Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) |
CJ-10 series, CJ-100 |
~300+ |
precision ground attack |
Over 1,500~2,500km |
|
Hypersonic glide vehicle system |
DF-17 |
Included in MRBM inventory |
Rapid penetration of missile defenses |
~1,800~2,500km |
This vast Asia-Pacific-based military infrastructure falls under the broad umbrella of China’s powerful arsenal of short- to long-range ballistic and cruise missiles. While a direct military confrontation could be widespread, destructive and detrimental to the global economy, China has made clear that unification of Taiwan and the mainland will be either political or military.
It is widely known that if the latter choice is made, the United States will become directly involved. Knowing this, China could have an incentive to order its military to launch preemptive strikes on U.S. military bases in Japan and possibly South Korea, with Guam often discussed as a potential target in advanced escalation scenarios. Given these realities, the U.S. military has adopted distributed-based operations to reduce the risk profile of forward-deployed forces and complex targeting of Chinese forces.
How Strategic Air Forces Lay the Foundation for U.S. Air Power in the Pacific
This article examines the usefulness of America’s major operating bases and USAF strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.
Breaking up is not difficult
All U.S. military units have developed strategies to operate in contested environments, whether in a potential conflict with Russia in Europe or in the region around the South China Sea. The Army has created a Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) of approximately 1,500 to 3,000 soldiers, which may be subdivided into smaller units of 20 to 150 soldiers depending on the mission.
The Marine Corps has two Marine Coastal Regiments of approximately 1,800 to 2,500 Marines, which can be subdivided into Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) of 50 to 100 Marines. The Air Force created Agile Combat Employment (ACE), and the Navy began distributed maritime operations.
Although MDTF and EABO elements are not identical, they consist of sensor and communications operators, command and control, air defense, offensive fires, and reconnaissance units. The ACE detachment is organized around four aircraft with a small command and control group, fuel and weapons personnel, maintenance personnel, and security and communications elements. To summarize, an ACE detachment consists of 50 to 100 Airmen.
The dispersion of these elements creates an interconnected web of mutual support, harassing and denying the enemy’s ability to maneuver while making it difficult to target given its size, flexibility, and mobility. This leads to improved survivability and intra-theater mobility for U.S. troops.
KC-130 Hercules lands on a reconstructed USMC airstrip on Peleliu, a World War II battle site.
As a measure to curb Chinese military expansion and more assertive behavior, the United States began renovating its World War II-era Pacific bases.
Calling Wake Island requires a grand strategy
Wake Island is located about halfway between Hawaii and Guam and outside the range of most of China’s missile arsenal. In emergencies involving China, Wake will serve as a support node to complement and enhance mobility and strategic flexibility. At this point, the island lacks the scale of a major air base, but will likely be used as a refueling point and forward logistics staging point to support military operations closer to the South China Sea.
Numerous upgrades have been completed to further support Wake Island’s military activities. This includes repairs and expansion of taxiway Bravo, construction of a new aircraft stand and hardstand, and repairs to drainage infrastructure under the taxiway. Hot Cargo Pads, used to handle hazardous cargo, were also recovered. Additionally, new airfield lighting and ground systems were both installed under the $87 million (£65 million) contract.
Currently, the U.S. Air Force maintains and operates the island’s 9,800-foot runway. The airfield can accommodate the following aircraft: lockheed martin F-35 attack aircraft, 
Regarding the latter, the US Navy plans to use Wake Airfield twice over a 60-day period from June 12 to November 30 for ‘Naval Summer Exercise 2026’. The P-8 will be operated by Task Force 72, which leads reconnaissance and surveillance operations for the U.S. 7th Fleet based in Japan.
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Latest activity on Wake Island
Recently, in November 2025, soldiers from the 25th Artillery Brigade, 25th Division of the U.S. Army conducted a dry firing of the HIMARS mobile rocket system. This operation was conducted through a rotation at the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center on Wake Island. The training exercise demonstrated the ability of rocket artillery crews to rapidly deploy to a remote operational site and rapidly set up, launch and redeploy. This operation utilized C-17s optimized for landing on remote runways and unprepared landing pads.
A little earlier, in mid-December 2024, the U.S. Marine Corps’ 12th Coastal Anti-Aircraft Battalion conducted Exercise Wake, which focused on long-range tactical air surveillance airstrikes. During this operation, the Marine Corps deployed the sophisticated AN/TPS-80 radar complex (ground/air mission-oriented radar) capable of detecting, identifying, and tracking various types of missiles, aircraft, and weapons projectiles. The purpose of the training was to quickly deploy and hone skills to be used while operating in a contested environment with fellow adversaries.
These training scenarios are all part of a distributed web of operations. While the Army is fielding HIMARS, it will be connected to a detection and tracking node within a multi-domain task force with capabilities similar to those established by the Marine Corps. This highlights the need to spread capabilities and rapidly move them to new sites to complicate enemy targeting missions.
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A complex new world of operating in a highly competitive environment
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, U.S. forces have been able to operate without the worries or constraints of their more capable fellow competitors. That is certainly not the case now that China is rapidly building up its navy and air force and reorganizing its military. Although China has not had a serious military confrontation since its border war with Vietnam, its military is now far more capable and can operate over an increasingly wider range than then.
At the same time, the U.S. military and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region are operating under the protection of a Chinese rocket force that can reach targets as far away as the island of Guam. These new realities have resulted in a distribution of forces and capabilities to increase the resilience and survivability of China’s military, especially its navy and air force, and to complicate its operational environment.
It is clear that the U.S. military and partner nations must continue to conduct joint training focused on expeditionary and distributed operations. This should also be accompanied by the opening of newer, more distributed bases of operations, such as the islands of Wake and Peleliu.
