U.S. officials say the Titan submersible exploded due to faulty design.

grey placeholderAmerican Photo Archive Titan SubmersibleAmerican Photo Archives

According to official reports, OceanGate’s Titan submersible exploded during a trip to the Titanic wreck due to poor engineering and multiple ship test failures.

Titan exploded in June 2023, killing all five on board, including OceanGate’s CEO.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found that the vehicle’s engineering processes were “inadequate,” which led to the defects and failed to meet strength and durability requirements.

The NTSB said the company did not properly test the Titan and therefore did not know its true strength. They were also unaware that the vessel had been damaged and should have been taken out of service before its final voyage.

Titan disappeared in the North Atlantic while attempting to dive to the wreck of the Titanic, about 372 miles off St. John’s and Labrador, Newfoundland, Canada.

In August, the U.S. Coast Guard released a report on the explosion, which found the incident “preventable” and criticized OceanGate’s “seriously flawed” safety practices.

Stockton Rush, CEO and co-founder of OceanGate, piloted Titan’s final journey.

Passengers who each paid up to $250,000 to take part in the dive included deep-sea explorers Paul-Henri Nargeolet, Shahzada Dawood and his 19-year-old sons Suleman Dawood and Hamish Harding.

Designed and built by OceanGate, the Titan is 6.7 meters (22 feet) long, with a passenger compartment made of carbon fiber and titanium for the dome and some other parts.

The ill-fated submersible, which exploded at a depth of 3,363 m (11,033 ft) (the Titanic wreck was located at 3,880 m), was the second version of the ship. OceanGate condemned the first version after testing.

grey placeholderGraphic showing a text message sent by a submersible with a blue sea background

During the investigation, the NTSB found problems with OceanGate’s safety culture.

While some employees said safety was their top priority, others, including a former marine operations director and technician, highlighted an environment where “safety issues, especially design issues, were ignored.”

A technician at the company said he had concerns about OceanGate’s business model, particularly its acceptance of paying customers as “mission specialists” rather than passengers.

Under U.S. regulations, it is illegal to transport passengers on experimental submersibles.

The technician told the NTSB he told Mr. Rush: “… You can’t just change a person’s title when receiving compensation.”

grey placeholderA wide shot from a U.S. Coast Guard deep-sea submersible CCTV camera shows the wreckage of another submersible vehicle.US Coast Guard

Part of Titan’s wrecked hull on the ocean floor

In a later conversation on the same topic, the engineer recalled that Mr. Rush said, “If the (U.S.) Coast Guard was a problem…he would buy himself a congressman and get rid of it.”

OceanGate permanently suspended operations following the incident.

In its report, the NTSB found that U.S. and international voluntary guidelines and U.S. small passenger vessel regulations were “insufficient to ensure that OceanGate complies with established industry standards” to blame for the collapse.

The NTSB commissioned a study of how the U.S. Coast Guard evaluates so-called pressure vessels that carry people and recommended that the regulations be updated if changes are proposed.